# THE FAMILY BUSINESS IN THE SPANISH FOOD AND BEVERAGE INDUSTRY (I) 

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## 1. Introduction

The last few years have seen a growth in the amount of research into Family Businesses (FBs). This has been partly due to the development of (national and international) FB associations, the creation of FB departments in various universities, and the interest shown by certain firms of consultants.

The research that has been published to date seems to focus on three areas: 1) The importance of FBs within the national economy of a given country (Galve and Salas, 1993; Gallo and Garcia Pont, 1988; Hugron and Dumas, 1991; Leach, 1990; Ward, 1983). 2) The differences between FBs and non-family businesses (NFBs) in terms of their behavior and the problems they face (Chaganti and Damanpur, 1991; Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Gallo and Estapé, 1992 a and b; Merino and Salas, 1993; Welsch, 1991). 3) Proposals for dealing with the problems that are most typical of FBs (Aronoff and Ward, 1991; Briere, 1991; Font, 1987 and 1988; Gallo, 1989).

Some studies have found significant differences in the role that FBs and NFBs have in an economy, depending on the size of the companies and their area of activity, as well as in specific aspects of their behavior (Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Gallo and Estapé, 1992a; Leach, 1990). These findings have not been corroborated by all the research (Merino and Salas, 1993).

This paper follows the first of the three paths described above and seeks to clarify the role of FBs and the peculiarities of their behavior in the Spanish «Food and Beverage» industry, taking into account the variables of company size, company age, geographical location and main product.

For the purposes of this study, a firm has been considered to be a FB when more than $50 \%$ of the capital is in the hands of one family and some of the family members are actively involved as members of its board and/or management team. Since the information available does not allow one to check whether there are members of the second or following

[^0]generations working in the firm, this has not been used as a criterion in determining a firm's status, although it is in fact coming to be regarded as basic when classifying FBs (Gallo, 1994).

The FBs were identified using the data on shareholder composition provided by the 1991 edition of the «Alimarket» yearbook and the information on the structure of governance of the firms contained in «Maxwell Espinosa» (1991). Where these data were insufficient, the «Asociación española de codificación comercial» was consulted, and in the last resort the firms were interviewed personally by telephone.

The Spanish «Food and Beverage» industry has certain characteristies that make it significant for the study of FBs. Specifically:

1) It is an important component of the Spanish economy. This is evident from the following table, which uses data from the 1992 Statistical Yearbook (National Statistics Institute. Madrid, 1992), which distinguishes between Agriculture, Industry (not including Construction), and Construction.

2) It is influential in that it is well represented among the largest 1,000 companies in Spain (Gallo and Estapé, 1992).

|  | Number of <br> firms | Sales (billion <br> pesetas) | Workforce |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1,000 largest | 1,000 | 30,903 | $1,291,289$ |
| Food and beverage <br> sector | 160 | $100 \%$ |  |

3) It shows a tendency towards the globalization of products and brands (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Porter, 1986), which could favor the penetration and growth of multinationals (many of which are not FBs), while at the same time it has witnessed a tendency towards the strengthening of local products and brands, many of which were created and developed by local FBs.
4) Given the nature of the products, firms have to make significant investments in marketing and in building up distribution networks in order to penetrate the market and grow. The owners of FBs may find such intangible assets difficult to understand or consider them a risky investment.
5) Achieving higher production volumes and meeting the standards of quality demanded by consumers and government regulations may require investments in plant and equipment that are beyond the financial capabilities of a large number of FBs.

This study shows:

- The importance of FBs in the Food and Beverage industry since they represent between $40 \%$ and $50 \%$ of the total.
- The difficulties that FBs have in achieving growth.
- The influence that the characteristics of each subsector, such as age, growth, concentration, entry barriers etc., have on the intensity of FB activity.
- The difficulties that FBs have in operating in less traditional activities and with less traditional organizational forms.
- The existence in most of the subsectors of outstanding FBs that hold leadership positions.


## 2. Characteristics of the sample

The sample is taken from the 867 companies in the Food and Beverage industry (1) that had a turnover of 1,000 million pesetas or more in 1990. It consists of the 859 firms (out of the total of 867) that it was possible to classify as either FBs or NFBs.

Although the «Alimarket» yearbook provides company data for «Sales», «Workforce», «Exports», «Imports», «Annual investment in fixed assets» and «Profit», the data are not always complete (2). For this reason, the data on «Imports» and «Profits» have not been included in the analysis.

It is difficult to compare the sample used in this study with the firms in the Food and Beverage industry as a whole, owing to the differences in the way firms are classified into subsectors and in the type of information provided in the different statistical studies. According to data supplied by the National Statistics Institute, the 859 firms in the sample represent $2 \%$ of the total number of firms in the Food and Beverage industry (3), and account for $43 \%$ of total employment in the industry. The 446 firms in the sample that provide information regarding exports represent $1 \%$ of the total number of firms in the industry and account for $44 \%$ of the industry's total exports.

The data on sales and workforce (4) and the ratio of sales per employee are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below.

Table 1


Table 2

| Workforce <br> (number of people) | $1-100$ | $101-500$ | $501-1,000$ | $>1,000$ | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms <br> and $\%$ | 534 | $23.7 \%$ |  |  |  |

Table 3


Tables 1 and 2 show that a large number ( $75.7 \%$ ) of the firms in the sample have sales of between 1,000 and 5,000 million pesetas and employ fewer than 100 people ( $63.7 \%$ of the sample). The data also show a high degree of sales concentration, in that a relatively small number (49) of firms account for $40 \%$ of total sales. Something similar can be seen with employment in the sector, since $49.4 \%$ of the workforce is retained by just 65 firms. Table 3 also indicates that more than half ( $66.1 \%$ ) of the firms sell less than 50 million pesetas per employee.

There is a serious difficulty when it comes to analyzing the data on exports (Tables 4 and 5). Since we have data for only 446 firms, we cannot be sure whether the rest of the companies in the sample simply do not export or whether the relevant information has been omitted from the Alimarket yearbook.

Table 4

| Level of exports <br> (millions of pesetas) | $<100$ | $100-1,000$ | $1,000-5,000$ | $>5,000$ | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms <br> and $\%$ | 111 | $24.9 \%$ |  |  |  |

Table 5
$\left.\begin{array}{|l|l|l|l|l|l|}\hline \begin{array}{l}\text { Exports/sales } \\ \text { (in } \% \text { ) }\end{array} & <5 \% & 5 \%-25 \% & 25 \%-50 \% & 50 \%-75 \% & >75 \%\end{array}\right)$ Total

As far as the firms for which we do have export data are concerned, Table 4 shows that half of them export between 100 and 1,000 million pesetas per year and Table 5 shows that two-thirds export less than $25 \%$ of their total sales. The information on equity and yearly investment in fixed assets, and the ratios of these two values to the number of employees, is shown in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9.

Table 6 indicates that a fairly large percentage (38.3\%) of the total equity of the 485 companies in the sample that provide data is concentrated in a very small number of firms (18). At the same time, the great majority of the firms have equity of less than 1 billion pesetas and, as can be seen from Table 7, have equity per employee of less than 10 million pesetas.

Table 6


Table 7

| Equity/workforce <br> (millions of pesetas per <br> employee) | $<10$ | $10-25$ | $25-50$ | $>50$ | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms <br> and \% | 309 | 128 | 30 | 11 | 478 |

Table 8

| $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { Yearly fixed asset } \\ \text { investment } \\ \text { (millions of pesetas) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | < 500 | 500-1,000 | 1,000-5,000 | > 5,000 | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms and \% |  | $7 \%$ | $9 \%$ | 4 $0.7 \%$ | $532$ |
| Total yearly investment (millions of pesetas) and \% | $25$ | $24,783$ | $88,001$ | $23,622$ | $100 \%$ |

Table 9

| Yearly fixed asset <br> investment/workforce <br> (millions of pesetas per <br> employee) | $<5$ | $5-10$ | $10-25$ | $>25$ | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms <br> and $\%$ | 435 | 64 | 26 | 4 | 529 |

In analyzing annual investment in fixed assets, one must bear in mind that the figures given are for investments made in 1990 and not, as would have been preferable, the average investment over a number of years. Tables 8 and 9 show that a large majority of the companies in the sample invested less than 500 million pesetas in 1990, and less than 5 million pesetas per employee.

The number of large firms (as a percentage of the total) and the weight they carry within the sample is shown below:

```
                                    5.7% capture 40% of total SALES
7.8% employ 49.4% of the WORKFORCE
    2.4% capture 22% of total EXPORTS
        7.8% own 56.4% of total EQUITY
9.7% make 57.8% of the total ANNUAL INVESTMENT
```

In short, we can say that large firms have a very considerable share of the total in each of the dimensions analyzed, and that to reach this size huge investments in fixed assets are needed.

With regard to the date of foundation (age of the firm), Tables 10 and 11 show that a large proportion of the sample are young ( $67 \%$ started after 1960), and that there is a correlation between size of firm and age.

Table 10

| Foundation year | $<1900$ | $1900-1930$ | $1931-1960$ | $1961-1990$ | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Number of firms <br> and $\%$ | 30 | 58 | 137 | 460 | 685 |
| Average sales per firm <br> (millions of pestas) | 4,803 | 9,140 | 8,413 | 4,523 | 5,705 |

Table 11

| Level of sales <br> (millions of pesetas) | $1,000-5,000$ | $5,000-20,000$ | $20,000-50,000$ | $>50,000$ | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms <br> and $\%$ | 650 | 160 | 42 |  | 8 |
| Average age <br> (years) | $75.7 \%$ | $18.6 \%$ | $4.9 \%$ | $0.8 \%$ | $100 \%$ |

As can be seen in Table 12, there are considerable differences -in the dimensions analyzed in this study- between the 19 subsectors of the Food and Beverage industry.
Table 12
Number of firms, sales, workforce, exports, equity, investment







| SUBSECTOR | Number of firms and \% | Sales (billions of pesetas) and \% | Workforce and \% | Exports <br> (billions of pesetas) and \% | Equity (billions of pesetas) and \% | Investment* <br> (billions of pesetas) and \% | Average age (years) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 50 | 593 | 6,222 | 81 | 69 | 8 | 29 |
|  | 5.82\% | 12.25\% | 4.23\% | ++ 21.88\% | 8.66\% | 4.17\% |  |
| BOTTLED WATER | 10 | 33 | 1,543 | 0.037 | 5 | 3 | 35 |
|  | - $1.16 \%$ | --0.68\% | 1.05\% | ---0.01\% | $-0.63 \%$ | 1.56\% |  |
| SUGAR AND HONEY | 9 | 191 | 4,356 | 6 | 80 | 3 | 30 |
|  | --1.05\% | 3.95\% | 2.96\% | 1.62\% | +10.04\% | 1.56\% |  |
| COFFEE AND TEA | 17 | 54 | 1,263 | 0.231 | 23 | 1 | 40 |
|  | 1.98\% | 1.12\% | 0.86\% | --0.06\% | 2.89\% | -0.52\% |  |
| MEAT PRODUCTS | 190 | 715 | 24,248 | 17 | 72 | 30 | --23 |
|  | +++ $22.12 \%$ | +++14.78\% | +++16.48\% | 4.59\% | 9.03\% | ++ 15.63\% |  |
| BEER | 22 | 292 | 15,783 10.73\% | 4 | $109++13.68 \%$ | 37 | +++61 |
|  | 2.56\% | 6.03\% | 10.73\% | 1.08\% |  | +++19.28\% |  |
| FROZEN FOODS | 64 | 324 | 11,478 | 28 | 42 | 19 | -- - 17 |
|  | 7.45\% | 6.70\% | 7.80\% | 7.56\% | 5.27\% | 9.90\% |  |
| CANNED FISH | 32 | 96 | 3,941 $2.68 \%$ | 8 | 16 | 3 | +41 |
|  | 3.73\% | 1.98\% |  | 2.16\% | 2.01\% | 1.56\% |  |
| CANNED VEGETABLES | 57 | 156 | 3.673 | $59+15.93 \%$ | 22 | 6 | 27 |
|  | 6.64\% | 3.22\% | 2.50\% |  | 2.76\% | 3.13\% |  |
| SWEETS | 38 4.42\% | 124 | 5.359 3.64\% | 17 - $4.59 \%$ | 14 | 3 | 38 |
|  |  | 2.56\% |  |  |  | 1.56\% |  |
| SPICES, SAUCES AND VINEGAR | 8 -- 0.93\% | $12 \quad--0.25 \%$ | $296-$ - - 0.20\% | 3 | 1 | 0.202 | -25 |
|  |  |  |  | 0.81\% | ---0.13\% | -- $0.11 \%$ |  |
| DRIED FRUITS AND SNACKS | $25.2 .91 \%$ | 87 | 3,704 $2.52 \%$ | $13 \quad 3.51 \%$ | $4-0.50 \%$ | 3 | --23 |
|  |  | 1.80\% |  |  |  | 1.56\% |  |
| BISCUITS AND <br> INDUSTRIAL PASTRIES | 44 | 212 4.38\% | 13,727 $9.33 \%$ | $2-0.54 \%$ | $44 \quad 5.52 \%$ | $6 \quad 3.13 \%$ | -25 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FLOUR | 26 3.03\% | 66 | 1,235 $-0.84 \%$ | $51.35 \%$ | 7 | $0.73-\mathrm{e}$ - $0.38 \%$ | 33 |
|  |  | 1.36\% |  |  | 0.88\% |  |  |
| DAIRY PRODUCTS | $86+10.01 \%$ | $645+$ | 19,912 | $9 \quad 2.43 \%$ | $52 \quad 6.52 \%$ | $28+14.59 \%$ | 27 |
|  |  |  | ++ 13.54\% |  |  | + $14.59 \%$ |  |
| PASTA | $25.2 .91 \%$ | 98 | $\begin{array}{ll}1,952 & \\ & 1.33 \%\end{array}$ | 11 2.97\% | $21 \quad 2.63 \%$ | 6 | 35 |
|  |  | 2.03\% |  |  |  | 3.13\% |  |
| SOFT DRINKS | $30 \quad 3.49 \%$ | 479 | 10,845 7.37\% | $2-0.54 \%$ | 16 | $15 \quad 7.82 \%$ | --23 |
|  |  | 9.90\% |  |  | 2.01\% |  |  |
| WINES AND LIQUORS | $106+$ | 620$+12.81 \%$ | 16,396 | $99 \quad+++26.74 \%$ | 195 | 17 | ++ 53 |
|  |  |  | +11.15\% |  |  | 8.86\% |  |
| CIDERS AND JUICES | 20 2.33\% | 42 | 1,165 $\quad-0.79 \%$ | 6 <br>  | $5-0.63 \%$ | $3 \quad 156 \%$ | --23 |
|  |  | -0.87\% |  |  |  |  |  |
| TOTAL | 859 100\% | $\begin{array}{\|cc\|}4,839 & \\ & 100 \%\end{array}$ | 147,098$100 \%$ | 370 100\% | 797 100\% | 192 100\% |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

[^1]As far as «Number of firms» is concerned, some of the subsectors in our sample show definite concentration (a small number of companies with annual sales in excess of 1,000 million pesetas). This is evident in the «Spices, Sauces and Vinegar» subsector as well as in the «Sugar and Honey» and «Bottled Water» subsectors. Other subsectors show strong signs of fragmentation (the opposite of concentration); for example, «Meat Products», «Wines and Liquors» and «Dairy Products». This will naturally lead to very different forms of rivalry and competition between the firms in each subsector (Caves, 1977).

With regard to size of firm, in the sense of sales volume and number of employees, the «Meat Products», «Wines and Liquors» and «Dairy Products» subsectors clearly occupy a prominent position. The extreme opposite can be found in the «Spices, Sauces and Vinegar» and «Juices and Ciders» subsectors, which are characterized by a relatively low level of sales and small workforce.

Exports are important in only three subsectors: «Wines and Liquors», «Oils and Fats» and «Canned Vegetables».

With regard to the aggregate figure for equity, the most important subsectors are «Wines and Liquors», «Beer», «Sugar and Honey» and «Oils and Fats», while «Spices, Sauces and Vinegar», «Dried Fruits and Snacks» and «Bottled Water» are at the opposite end of the scale.

The subsectors with the highest level of investment in fixed assets in 1990 were «Beers», «Meat Products», «Dairy Products» and «Frozen Foods».

As for the average age of the firms in each subsector, there is a big difference between, on the one hand, «Beers» and «Wines and Liquors», both over 50 years old, and, on the other, «Juices and Ciders», «Soft Drinks», «Dried Fruits and Snacks» and «Meat Products», which in 1990 were not yet 25 years old.
Table 13

| SUBSECTORS | Sales/ firm (millions) | Sales/ workforce (millions) | Exports/ sales (\%) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Equity/ } \\ & \text { firm } \\ & \text { (millions) } \end{aligned}$ | Equity/ workforce (millions) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Investment*/ } \\ \text { firm } \\ \text { (millions) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Investment*/ workforce (millions) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 11,860 | +++267 | 27.58\% | 1,921 | + 17.19 | 258 | +4.33 |
| BOTTLED WATER | 3,300 | ---23 | -- $0.36 \%$ | 846 | -4.34 | 563 | 3.32 |
| SUGAR AND HONEY | +++21,333 | 74 | 11.13\% | 1,038 | 16.85 | + 565 | 1.77 |
| COFFEE AND TEA | 3,118 | 86 | -- 1.87\% | 1,663 | 14.05 | 194 | 2.47 |
| MEAT PRODUCTS | 3,763 | 57 | 9.14\% | 757 | --4.21 | 241 | 2.6 |
| BEER | + 13,273 | --25 | 6.02\% | +++6,413 | 12.85 | +++ 2,180 | 2.44 |
| FROZEN FOODS | 5,047 | 60 | 13.91\% | 1,433 | 7.98 | 376 | 2.95 |
| CANNED FISH | 2,969 | -33 | 14.15\% | 779 | 6.76 | --118 | -- - 1.33 |
| CANNED VEGETABLES | 2,737 | 70 | +++ $44.51 \%$ | 676 | 14.56 | 173 | 2.71 |
| SWEETS | 3,263 | 41 | 14.52\% | 565 | 5.34 | 135 | - 1.69 |
| SPICES, SAUCES AND VINEGAR | -- - 1,500 | 46 | ++ 41.59\% | --386 | -- - 4.07 | ---67 | --1.67 |
| DRIED FRUITS AND SNACKS | 3,480 | 112 | 30.74\% | ---286 | 9.75 | 195 | 2.97 |
| BISCUITS AND <br> INDUSTRIAL PASTRIES | 4,841 | 50 | 2.59\% | 1,760 | 6.02 | 299 | 3.91 |
| FLOUR | - 2,538 | 96 | +35.49\% | 621 | 12.21 | - 122 | 2.37 |
| DAIRY PRODUCTS | 7,488 | 49 | 9.70\% | 1,278 | 5.27 | 492 | 3.07 |
| PASTA | 3,960 | + 131 | 12.38\% | 1,321 | ++ 19.37 | 374 | ++ 10.23 |
| SOFT DRINKS | ++ 15,967 | ++ 135 | - 1.98\% | +1,963 | 9.17 | ++ 1,362 | +++ 12.77 |
| WINES AND LIQUORS | 5,840 | 75 | 28.73\% | ++ 2,668 | +++ 21.91 | 258 | 3.1 |
| CIDERS AND JUICES | --2,100 | 44 | 25.20\% | -461 | 9.53 | 208 | 3.97 |

[^2]Table 13 shows the average sales per firm in each subsector. There are enormous differences (up to 15 times) between the largest firms («Sugar and Honey», «Soft Drinks», «Beer») and the smallest ones («Spices, Sauces and Vinegar», «Juices and Ciders», «Canned Vegetables»). The differences are also significant, although not so pronounced, when we compare sales per employee, which can be regarded as high in some subsectors, such as «Oils», «Soft Drinks» and «Pasta», and low in others, such as «Bottled Water», «Beer» and «Canned Fish».

The differences are much greater when we look at exports as a percentage of sales. Certain subsectors can be regarded as export-oriented («Canned Vegetables», «Spices, Sauces and Vinegar», «Flour»), while others are more local («Bottled Water», «Soft Drinks», «Coffee and Tea».
smaller. (Average equity per firm is high in «Beer», «Wine and Liquor» and «Soft Drinks», and low in «Dried Fruits and Snacks», «Spices, Sauces and Vinegar» and «Juices and Ciders». Equity per employee is high in «Wine and Liquor», «Pasta» and «Oils», and low in «Spices, Sauces and Vinegar», «Meat Products» and «Bottled Water».)

The obvious differences between the various subsectors, not only in their overall dimensions (Table 12) but also in the different ratios (Table 13), may help to explain why FBs are more active in certain subsectors than in others. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the data have not been obtained from a longitudinal study that analyzes a longer period of time, but relate exclusively to the year 1990. In order to interpret the structure of a subsector, however, and the type of firm that survives in it, it is extremely important to know the circumstances these firms have been through, the changes they have undergone, and so on (Haman, M. and Freeman, J., 1989).

Table 14 segments the data geographically by Autonomous Community. The three Communities with the highest values for each variable and the three with the lowest values have been marked out. We can see that, in terms of numbers, the FBs in our sample are clearly concentrated in Catalonia, Andalusia and Madrid. These three Communities account for more than $63 \%$ of the total workforce, sales and exports of the industry.

Finally, Table 15 shows how the firms in each subsector are distributed across the Autonomous Communities. It is notable that some subsectors, such as «Oils», «Sugar and Honey», «Canned Fish», «Canned Vegetables», «Sweets», «Dried Fruits», «Pasta» and «Juices and Ciders», tend to be concentrated in just a few Communities, whereas others are present in all or nearly all of the Communities.
Table 14

Table 15. Number of firms per community and subsector

|  | Vegetable oil and fat | Bottled water | Sugar and honey | Coffee and tea | Meat products | Beer | Frozen foods | Canned fish | Canned vegetables |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ANDALUSIA | $16$ <br> (1) $32.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 1 & \\ & 10.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $1 \begin{array}{ll}1 \\ \end{array}$ | 11 <br>  | $17$ <br> (3) $8.95 \%$ | 6 <br> (1) $27.27 \%$ | 7 <br>  | 4 <br> (2) $12.50 \%$ | 14 <br> (2) $24.56 \%$ |
| ARAGON | $\begin{array}{ll} 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 77 <br>  | 1 <br>  <br>  | 1 <br>  | 0 <br>  | 1$1.75 \%$ |
| ASTURIAS | 1 <br>  | $10.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 3 <br>  <br>  | $29.09 \%$ | 0 <br>  | 0 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| BALEARIC ISLANDS | $00.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $21.05 \%$ | 11 <br>  | 0 <br>  | 0 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| CANARY ISLANDS | 1 <br>  | $10.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 11 <br>  | 2 | $2 \begin{array}{r} \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 1  <br>  $1.56 \%$ | 1  <br>   | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| CANTABRIA | $00.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $00.00 \%$ | 15 | $3 \quad 1.58 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 2 3.13\% | 11  <br>   | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| CASTILE AND LEON | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 1 & \\ & 10.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 1$11.11 \%$ | 11 <br>  | (3) $8.95 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 22 <br>  | 1  <br>   | 11 <br>  |
| CASTILE LA MANCHA | $510.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 1 & \\ & 10.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $00.00 \%$ | $00.00 \%$ | $9 \quad 4.74 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 0 <br>  | 0 <br>  | $1.75 \%$ |
| CATALONIA | 8 <br> (2) $16.00 \%$ | 4 <br> (1) $40.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 1 & \\ & 11.11 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 2 <br> (3) $11.76 \%$ | 62 <br> (1) $32.63 \%$ | $29.09 \%$ | $14$ <br> (1) $21.88 \%$ | 1 3.13\% | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| MADRID | 13 <br> (3) $26.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 5 <br> (1) $55.56 \%$ | 5 <br> (1) $29.41 \%$ | $21$ <br> (2) $11.05 \%$ | 4 <br> (2) $18.18 \%$ | $12$ <br> (2) $18.75 \%$ | 2 | $23.51 \%$ |
| NAVARRE | 1 $2.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $4 \quad 2.11 \%$ | $1 \begin{array}{ll}1 & \\ \\ & 4.55 \%\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 3 \\ \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $13.13 \%$ | 6 <br> (3) $10.53 \%$ |
| VALENCIA | 1 2.00\% | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $1 \begin{array}{ll}1 \\ \end{array}$ | $3$ <br> (2) $17.65 \%$ | $15 \quad 7.89 \%$ | $1 \quad 4.55 \%$ | $8$ <br> (3) $12.50 \%$ | $13.13 \%$ | $58.77 \%$ |
| EXTREMADURA | $1 \quad 2.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 00000 | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 22 | $00.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 0 <br>  | $1.75 \%$ |
| GALICIA | 11 <br>  | $10.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $13 \quad 6.84 \%$ | 11  <br>   | 12 <br> (2) $18.75 \%$ | 17 <br> (1) $53.13 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| LA RIOJA | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 0 $0.00 \%$ | 0 0.00\% | $1 \begin{array}{ll}1 & \\ \\ \end{array}$ | 44 | 0 <br>  | 0 <br>  | 0 <br>  | 6 <br> (3) $10.53 \%$ |
| BASQUE COUNTRY | 1 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 2 <br> (3) $11.76 \%$ | 3 | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 1 <br>  | $3$ <br> (3) $9.38 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| MURCIA | 11 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 6 $3.16 \%$ | 11  <br>   | 1 $1.56 \%$ | 0 <br>  | 20 <br> (1) $35.09 \%$ |
| TOTAL | $50 \quad 100 \%$ | 10 100\% | $9100 \%$ | 17 100\% | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 190 & \\ & 100 \% \end{array}$ | $22100 \%$ | 64 $100 \%$ | $32 \quad 100 \%$ | 57 |

Table 15. Number of firms per community and subsector (Continued)

|  | Sweets | Spices and sauces | Dried fruits | Biscuits, ind. pastries | Flour | Dairy products | Pasta | Soft drinks | Winers and liquors | Juices and ciders |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ANDALUSIA | 1 2.63\% | (2) $25.00 \%$ | $0$ | 3 6.82\% | 6 <br> (1) $23.08 \%$ | $7 \quad 8.14 \%$ | 5 <br> (2) $20.00 \%$ | 3 3 10.00\% | 27 <br> (1) $25.47 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| ARAGON | $25.26 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 3 3 $6.82 \%$ | 6 <br> (1) $23.08 \%$ | $2.33 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $2.67 \%$ | $2 \begin{array}{r} \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 2 & \\ & 10.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| ASTURIAS | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 0 $0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $8 \quad 9.30 \%$ | 11 <br>  | 1$6.67 \%$ <br>  | $2 \begin{array}{r}1.89 \%\end{array}$ | 11 <br>  |
| BALEARIC ISLANDS | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 0 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 11 <br>  | 11  <br>   | 33 <br> $3.49 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 11 $3.33 \%$ <br>   | 0 <br>  | 0 <br> $0.00 \%$ |
| CANARY ISLANDS | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 0 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 11 <br>  | $3 \quad 3.49 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $3 \quad 10.00 \%$ | $10.94 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| CANTABRIA | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 1 $1.16 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0.0 .00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| CASTILE AND LEON | $25.26 \%$ | 0 <br>  | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 2 & \\ & \text { (3) } 8.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 5 <br> (3) $11.36 \%$ | $27.69 \%$ | 11 <br> (2) $12.79 \%$ | $3$ <br> (3) $12.00 \%$ | 0 $0.00 \%$ | 22 | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| CASTILE LA MANCHA | $25.26 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 11 <br>  | 9 <br> (3) $10.47 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 1 & \\ & 4.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $00.00 \%$ | $\begin{aligned} & 14 \\ & \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| CATALONIA | $13$ <br> (1) $34.21 \%$ | 2 <br> (2) $25.00 \%$ | 11 <br> (1) $44.00 \%$ | 11 <br> (1) $25.00 \%$ | 6 <br> (1) $23.08 \%$ | 15 <br> (1) $17.44 \%$ | 8 <br> (1) $32.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 3 & \\ & 10.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 17 <br> (2) $16.04 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 2 & \\ & 10.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| MADRID | $\begin{array}{\|lr\|} \hline 3 & \\ & \text { (3) } 7.89 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 2 \\ 8.00 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 5 & \\ & 11.36 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 15 <br> (1) $17.44 \%$ | $28.00 \%$ | $9$ <br> (1) $30.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 7 & \\ & 6.60 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 2 & \\ & 10.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| NAVARRE | 1 $2.63 \%$ | 0 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $3 \quad 6.82 \%$ | $27.69 \%$ | $1.16 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $4 \quad 3.77 \%$ | 5.00\% |
| VALENCIA | 9 <br> (2) $23.68 \%$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 1 & \\ & 12.50 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $9$ <br> (2) $36.00 \%$ | $7$ <br> (2) $15.91 \%$ | 11 <br>  | $2.33 \%$ | 5 <br> (2) $20.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 3 & \\ & 10.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $8 \quad 7.55 \%$ | 4 <br> (2) $20.00 \%$ |
| EXTREMADURA | $\begin{array}{ll} 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 0 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $2.33 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 11  <br>   | $3 \quad 2.83 \%$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|} \hline 0 & \\ & 0.00 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| GALICIA | 1 2.63\% | 0 $0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $1 \begin{array}{ll} \\ \\ \end{array}$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $7 \quad 8.14 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 1 <br>  <br>  | 1 0.94\% | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ |
| LA RIOJA | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $00.00 \%$ | $00.00 \%$ | $00.00 \%$ | 0 $0.00 \%$ | $00.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $\begin{array}{ll}0 & \\ \\ \end{array}$ | $8 \quad 7.55 \%$ | 0 <br>  |
| BASQUE COUNTRY | $25.26 \%$ | 0 <br>  | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $3 \quad 6.82 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $3 \quad 10.00 \%$ | $7 \quad 6.60 \%$ | 5.00\% |
| MURCIA | $25.26 \%$ | $3$ <br> (1) $37.50 \%$ | 11  <br>   <br>   | 2 4.55\% | 0 $0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | $0 \quad 0.00 \%$ | 0  <br>  $0.00 \%$ | 33 | $7$ <br> (1) $35.00 \%$ |
| TOTAL | 38 100\% | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 25 \\ & \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 44 \\ & \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $26 \quad 100 \%$ | 86 | $25 \quad 100 \%$ | $30 \quad 100 \%$ | 106 100\% | $20 \quad 100 \%$ |
| (1): First largest value |  | 2): Second larg | value | (3): Third | ue |  |  |  |  |  |

## 3. Comparison between FBs and NFBs

Table 16 compares the total number of firms, sales, workforce, annual investment, equity and exports of FBs and NFBs, calculated as the sum of the figures for the individual firms in each group.

Table 16

| Number of firms | FB |
| :--- | :--- |
| Total sales |  |
| (billion pesetas) |  |
| Data from 859 firms |  |
| FB: 440 NFB: 419 |  |

Table 17 compares the values of a number of significant ratios, expressed as the average of the ratios of all the firms in each group.

The above data, while showing the considerable importance of FBs in the sector in 1990, both in number and in sales, workforce and exports, also reveal that FBs differ significantly from NFBs in having noticeably lower sales per employee and equity per employee.

Table 17

|  | FB | NFB | ALL THE <br> SAMPLE |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sales/workforce <br> (millions of pesetas) <br> Data from 838 firms <br> FB: 428 NFB: 410 | 59.29 | 93.77 | 76.16 |
| Exports/sales <br> Data from 445 firms <br> FB: 242 NFB: 203 | $22 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $21.47 \%$ |
| Equity/workforce <br> (millions of pesetas) <br> Data from 478 firms <br> FB: 245 NFB: 233 | 8.79 | 13.19 | 10.94 |
| Yearly fixed asset investment// <br> workforce <br> (millions of pesetas) <br> Data from 529 firms <br> FB: 256 NFB: 273 | 3.25 | 3.29 | 3.27 |

## Comparison by sales and size of workforce

In order to explore the similarities and differences between the two types of firm, the data were broken down still further.

Table 18 (5) segments the sample according to sales volume. It can be seen that FBs are concentrated in the $1,000-5,000$ million pesetas per year sales band, and that they are well represented, compared with NFBs, in the 5,000-20,000 range. However, their presence declines in the $20,000-50,000$ band and is very small at the top of the scale.

Table 18

| Sales level (millions of pesetas) | 1,000-5,000 |  | 5,000-20,000 |  | 20,000-50,000 |  | > 50,000 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 650 (100\%) |  | 160 (100\%) |  | 42 (100\%) |  | 7 (100\%) |  | 859 (100\%) |  |
| Total sales (billion pesetas) | 1,427 (100\%) |  | 1,474 (100\%) |  | 1,326 (100\%) |  | 612 (100\%) |  | 4,839 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 348 | 302 | 77 | 83 | 14 | 28 |  | 6 | 440 | 419 |
| \% | 53.5\% | 46.5\% | 48.1\% | 51.9\% | 33.3\% | 66.7\% | 14.3\% | 85.7\% | 51.2\% | 48.8\% |
| Sales | 739 | 688 | 722 | 752 | 454 | 872 | 83 | 529 | 1,998 | 2,841 |
| \% | 51.8\% | 48.2\% | 49\% | 51\% | 34.2\% | 65.8\% | 13.6\% | 86.4\% | 41.3\% | 58.7\% |

Table 19 (6) segments the firms according to number of employees. It shows that FBs have a strong presence in the 1-100 employee band; they are also well represented in the $101-500$ and in the 501-1,000 bands. Their presence is less marked, however, in the $>1,000$ segment.

Table 19

| Workforce level (number of people) | 1-100 |  | 101-500 |  | 501-1,000 |  | > 1,000 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 534 (100\%) |  | 239 (100\%) |  | 39 (100\%) |  | 26 (100\%) |  | 838 (100\%) |  |
| Total workforce (number of people) | 24,056 (100\%) |  | 50,435 (100\%) |  | 26,735 (100\%) |  | 45,872 (100\%) |  | 147,098 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 294 | 240 | 107 | 132 | 19 | 20 | 8 | 18 | 428 | 410 |
| \% | 55.1\% | 44.9\% | 44.8\% | 55.2\% | 48.7\% | 51.3\% | 30.8\% | 69.2\% | 51.1\% | 48.9\% |
| Workforce | 13,278 | 10,778 | 21,783 | 28,652 | 12,856 | 13,879 | 10,296 | 35,576 | 58,213 | 88,885 |
| \% | 55.2\% | 44.8\% | 43.2\% | 56.8\% | 48.1\% | 51.9\% | 22.4\% | 77.6\% | 39.6\% | 60.4\% |

Table 20 segments the firms according to sales per employee. We find that FBs have a strong presence up to the 200 million pesetas per employee mark, beyond which their presence declines rapidly, particularly in the highest segment (over 500 million pesetas per employee).

Table 20

| Sales/workforce (millions of pesetas) | $<50$ |  | 50-100 |  | 101-200 |  | 201-500 |  | > 500 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 554 (100\%) |  | 172 (100\%) |  | 72 (100\%) |  | 26 (100\%) |  | 14 (100\%) |  | 838 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 280 | 274 | 93 | 79 | 42 | 30 | 10 | 16 | 3 | 11 | 428 | 410 |
| \% | 50.5\% | 49.5\% | 54.1\% | 45.9\% | 58.3\% | 41.7\% | 38.5\% | 61.5\% | 21.4\% | 78.6\% | 51.1\% | 48.9\% |

In the light of these last three tables we can say that FBs and NFBs are quite similar, both in sales and in number of employees, up to a certain size, beyond which the presence of FBs declines considerably compared with that of NFBs.

On closer examination, the 28 largest firms in the sector ( 8 FBs and 20 NFBs ; see Exhibit 2), that is to say, the seven with sales of more than 50,000 million pesetas (Table 18) and the 26 with more than 1,000 employees (Table 19), can be seen to be mainly:

- NFBs that operate in subsectors in which one finds a strong business concentration on a global scale and in which various multinationals have entered the Spanish market by way of acquiring old FBs (i.e. beer, soft drinks, wines and liquors)
- NFBs that have come into being as a result of mergers between FBs, sometimes with the participation of financial institutions.
- FBs which have followed high growth strategies, making large investments in brand image, property, plant and distribution systems and strengthening their management teams.

The 14 firms ( 3 FBs and 11 NFBs ) with sales of more than 500 million pesetas per employee (Exhibit 3), which with one exception are not among the largest firms in the sample, are mainly:

- NFBs that act as intermediaries for exporting or local marketing.
- Second level cooperatives (or associations of cooperatives) geared towards sharing resources for distribution and sales.
- Firms which act as «flagships» in the property and brand management etc. of a group of companies.


## Comparison by level of exports (7)

According to the data shown in Table 21, there are more FBs than NFBs in the 1001,000 million peseta range, whereas the two types of firm are equally represented in the segments below 100 million pesetas and above 1,000 million pesetas.

Table 21

| Exports level (millions of pesetas) | < 100 |  | 100-1,000 |  | 1,000-5,000 |  | > 5,000 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 111 (100\%) |  | 227 (100\%) |  | 97 (100\%) |  | 11 (100\%) |  | 446 (100\%) |  |
| Total exports (millions of pesetas) | 5,176 (100\%) |  | 93,225 (100\%) |  | 191,079 (100\%) |  | 81,499 (100\%) |  | 370,979 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 58 | 53 | 135 | 92 | 46 | 51 | 3 | 8 | 242 | 204 |
| \% | 52.2\% | 47.8\% | 59.5\% | 40.5\% | 47.4\% | 52.6\% | 27.3\% | 72.7\% | 54.3\% | 45.7\% |
| Exports | 2,694 | 2,482 | 58,030 | 35,195 | 95,022 | 96,057 | 23,567 | 57,932 | 179,313 | 191,666 |
| \% | 52\% | 48\% | 62.2\% | 37.8\% | 49.7\% | 50.3\% | 28.9\% | 71.1\% | 48.3\% | 51,7\% |

Table 22 analyses the data for exports as a percentage of sales and shows the distribution of FBs and NFBs across a number of bands. It can be seen that, with the exception of the $>75 \%$ band, FBs seem to be more geared towards exporting than NFBs since their presence is much higher in the $25-50 \%$ and $50-75 \%$ bands.

In part this may be explained by the fact that the multinationals established in Spain tend to exploit local brands belonging to the Spanish firms that they have acquired, that they tend not to export the Spanish subsidiaries' production of their global brands, and that they limit the export of unbranded goods. This situation may change as economic integration in Europe proceeds and multinationals turn some of their regional plants into production platforms for the rest of Europe.

The 11 firms with exports of over 5,000 million pesetas (Exhibit 4) are large companies in terms of sales, workforce or sales per employee. Several are multinationals and all are geared towards the sale abroad of local products such as olive oil, sherry or seafood.

The 33 firms whose exports exceed $75 \%$ of sales (Exhibit 5) are mostly not very large in terms of sales and are basically oriented towards exporting local products such as olives, wine, saffron, etc.

Table 22

| Exports/sales (\%) | < $5 \%$ |  | 5\%-25\% |  | 25\%-50\% |  | 50\%-75\% |  | > $75 \%$ |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 157 (100\%) |  | 156 (100\%) |  | 62 (100\%) |  | 37 (100\%) |  | 33 (100\%) |  | 445 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 81 | 76 | 83 | 73 | 43 | 19 | 22 | 15 | 12 | 21 | 241 | 204 |
| \% | 51.6\% | 48.4\% | 53.2\% | 46.8\% | 69.3\% | 30.7\% | 59.5\% | 40.5\% | 36.4\% | 63.6\% | 54.2\% | 45.8\% |

## Comparison by level of equity

There are difficulties in comparing the level of equity of the firms in the sample owing to the consolidation of the various subsidiary companies under the parent. We run into a further problem when comparing FBs with other types of firm since we do not know exactly how reliable the information on the equity of FBs is. This is because FBs are particularly affected by capital gains and inheritance tax and so might conceivably tend to understate the figure for equity.

Table 23 interprets the information available in the Alimarket yearbook. As we can see, FBs and NFBs are more or less equally represented at all levels of equity, except among large firms with equity of over 10 billion pesetas.

According to Table 24, however, FBs tend to be concentrated in the group of firms with equity per employee of less than 10 million pesetas. And they have very little presence in the over 50 million pesetas per employee segment.

Table 23

| Equity level (millions of pesetas) | < 1,000 |  | 1,000-5,000 |  | 5,000-10,000 |  | > 10,000 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 342 (100\%) |  | 105 (100\%) |  | 20 (100\%) |  | 18 (100\%) |  | 485 (100\%) |  |
| Total equity (millions of pesetas) | 126,895 (100\%) |  | 221,056 (100\%) |  | 144,548(100\%) |  | 304,716 (100\%) |  | 797,215(100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 191 | 151 | 45 | 60 |  | 15 | 7 | 11 | 248 | 237 |
| \% | 55.8\% | 44.2\% | 42.9\% | 57.1\% | 25\% | 75\% | 38.9\% | 61.1\% | 51.1\% | 48.9\% |
| Equity | 68,013 | 58,882 | 93,118 | 127,938 | 31,728 | 12,820 | 88,187 | 216,529 | 281,046 | 516,169 |
| \% | 52\% | 48\% | 62,2\% | 37.8\% | 49.7\% | 50.3\% | 28.9\% | 71.1\% | 48.3\% | 51.7\% |

Table 24

| Equity/workforce (millions of pesetas) | $<10$ |  | 10-25 |  | 25-50 |  | > 50 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 309 (100\%) |  | 128 (100\%) |  | 30 (100\%) |  | 11 (100\%) |  | 478 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 180 | 129 | 54 | 74 | 9 | 21 | 2 | 9 | 245 | 233 |
| \% | 58.2\% | 41.8\% | 42.2\% | 57.8\% | 30\% | 70\% | 18.2\% | 81.8\% | 51.3\% | 48.7\% |

When we take a closer look at the 18 firms with equity of over 10 billion pesetas (Exhibit 6), we find more or less the same as when we looked at the firms with the highest sales and the largest workforce. In many cases they are the same firms.

When we look at the 11 firms with equity per employee of over 50 million pesetas (Exhibit 7), we see how this ratio is influenced by whether or not casual or seasonal workers are included in the calculation. Without further information, therefore, we cannot draw any conclusions comparable to those we obtained for firms with high levels of sales and exports per employee

## Comparison by level of annual investment in fixed assets

In making this comparison we have to take into account not only the possible bias for tax reasons but also the fact that the data are for 1990 only.

Tables 25 and 26 show that FBs and NFBs make similar investments in fixed assets, not only in actual amount up to the 5,000 million peseta mark, but also in terms of amount per employee up to a level of 25 million pesetas.

Table 25

| Yearly fixed asset investment (millions of pesetas) | < 500 |  | 500-1,000 |  | 1,000-5,000 |  | > 5,000 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 443 (100\%) |  | 37 (100\%) |  | 48 (100\%) |  | 4 (100\%) |  | 532 (100\%) |  |
| Yearly total investment (millions of pesetas) | 56,437 (100\%) |  | 24,783 (100\%) |  | 88,001 (100\%) |  | 23,622 (100\%) |  | 192,843 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 224 | 219 | 13 | 24 | 19 | 29 | 0 | 4 | 256 | 276 |
| \% | 50.6\% | 49.4\% | 35.1\% | 64.9\% | 39.6\% | 60.4\% | 0\% | 100\% | 48,1\% | 51,9\% |
| Yearly investment | 27,314 | 29,123 | 9,292 | 15,491 | 33,788 | 54,213 | 0 | 23,622 | 70,394 | 122,449 |
| \% | 48.4\% | 51.6\% | 37.5\% | 62.5\% | 38.4\% | 61.6\% | 0\% | 100\% | 36.5\% | 63.5\% |

Table 26

| Yearly fixed asset investment /sales (millions of pesetas) | < 5 |  | 5-10 |  | 10-25 |  | > 25 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 435 (100\%) |  | 64 (100\%) |  | 26 (100\%) |  | 4 (100\%) |  | 529 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 209 | 226 | 33 | 31 | 13 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 256 | 273 |
| \% | 48.1\% | 51.9\% | 51.6\% | 48.4\% | 50\% | 50\% | 25\% | 75\% | 48.4\% | 51.6\% |

Exhibit 8 gives data for the 4 firms with annual investment in fixed assets of more than 5 billion pesetas. As can be seen, three of them are large firms in the Beer subsector and one is a public firm in the Dairy Products subsector. On the other hand, of the 4 firms with investment per employee of over 25 million pesetas (Exhibit 9), three were holding companies or distributors with few employees, and one was a firm with a large proportion of casual workers.

## Comparison by year of foundation and age of firm

In this comparison, it is important to bear in mind that a firm which in 1990 was classified as a NFB may have started out as a FB. For this reason, the following comments refer to the firms as they were in 1990, either FBs or NFBs, regardless of what they may have been at an earlier stage.

Looking at Table 27 and specifically at the firms founded since 1900, we can say that the difference in size between FBs and NFBs increases as time goes by, since NFBs are comparatively larger than FBs in terms of average sales (those founded between 1900 and 1930 are $283 \%$ larger; those founded between 1930 and 1960 are $189 \%$ larger; while those founded after 1960 are only $7 \%$ larger).

Table 28 shows that, on average, FBs are older than NFBs in the various sales bands, particularly in the $>50,000$ million peseta band.

Exhibit 10 gives data on the 30 firms in the sample that were founded before 1900. It is worth noting that 17 of them ( $56.7 \%$ ) belong to the Wines and Liquor subsector and that hardly any of them are among the largest in terms of sales or size of workforce.

Table 27


Table 28

| Sales level (millions of pesetas) | 1,000-5,000 |  | 5,000-20,000 |  | 20,000-50,000 |  | > 50,000 |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of firms | 650 (100\%) |  | 160 (100\%) |  | 42 (100\%) |  | 7 (100\%) |  | 859 (100\%) |  |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number | 348 |  | 77 | 83 |  | 28 |  |  |  |  |
| \% | 53.5\% | 46.5\% | 48.1\% | 51.9\% | 33.3\% | 66.7\% | 14.3\% | 85.7\% | 51.2\% | 48.8\% |
| Average age (years) | 35 | 29 | 41 | 33 | 52 | 43 | 58 | 40 | 36 | 31 |

## Comparison by subsectors

Table 29 shows the weight of FBs in each dimension (number of firms, sales, workforce, exports, equity and investments) in each of the 19 subsectors. It also indicates where FBs are significantly above or below the average for the firms in the subsector in any given dimension.

It can be seen that FBs have a «very large»(VL) share of the «Canned Fish», «Sweets», and «Flour» subsectors. These three subsectors (see Tables 12 and 13) have a comparatively small volume of sales (total sales of the subsector) and are made up of medium-sized firms (in terms of sales) with significantly (around 50\%) lower levels of equity than the average for the sample.

Historically, they are subsectors without significant entry barriers, so that a large number of local businesses were able to establish themselves. At the same time, they have not been drastically affected by economic crises nor by changes in processing technology. In other words, compared with other subsectors of the Food and Beverage industry, they do not generally offer great opportunities for growth or expansion, either for the firms that already operate in these subsectors or for new entrants.

It is also noticeable that the FB in these three subsectors have a relatively high average age. We may conclude that most have successfully survived the difficulties of transferring power from the first to the second generation and therefore do not suffer from the structural weaknesses associated with the generational change. At the same time, it is likely that they have had time to gain strength and compete successfully.

FBs have a «large» (L) presence in the following subsectors:

- «Canned Vegetables», which is similar in characteristics to the three subsectors described above, though with a higher overall volume of sales.
- «Meat Products», which is made up of young firms with lower than average sales and equity, and which does not yet have any «large» firms. This subsector has no significant entry barriers in terms of capital or technology, but it does require experience given the regulatory complexities and the labor-intensive methods. On the other hand, it is one of the subsectors with the greatest variety of flavors, formats, etc., and is greatly influenced by local traditions. This is also the subsector with the highest sales and largest workforce and is present in most of the Autonomous Communities. Although there is surplus capacity at present, there may be opportunities for growth and acquisition, given that the average age of the FBs in this subsector suggests that they are probably still run by their founder and are therefore likely to come up against the problems of succession in the next few years.

The presence of FBs is «very small» (VS) in the following subsectors:

- «Sugar and Honey», where there is a high degree of concentration and the firms are among the largest in the sample in terms of sales and equity.
- «Beer», which has a small number of firms, some basically regional, others market leaders in Spain that are minority owned or have been acquired by multinationals. This subsector requires large investments in production processes to keep up to date and in advertising to gain brand loyalty.

FBs also have a very small (VS) presence in the «Oils and Fats» and «Dairy Products» subsectors. Both have a high total volume of sales and neither is as concentrated as the two subsectors described above. They can be characterized as follows:

- «Oils and Fats» is made up of firms of above average size for the sample in terms of sales and equity. There is a constant need for investments in plant and marketing, with major economies of scale that favor the larger firms. The subsector has been through a concentration process that was influenced by changes in government policy, the growing importance of distribution companies, and the emerging export opportunities.
- «Dairy products» is dominated by three firms (one of which is publicly owned). The other firms are undergoing a process of rationalization and concentration, partly due to the unavoidable need to cut costs among producers without a recognized brand since the product is somewhat in the nature of a commodity, and partly to the effort on the part of the firms that do have a recognized brand to extend their product range.

Among the subsectors in which FBs have a «small»(S) presence are «Bottled Water», «Coffee and Teas» and «Juices and Ciders». All of these have relatively low total sales and a small workforce. They are made up of a fairly small number of firms with average sales and equity $50 \%$ below the average for the Food and Beverage industry as a whole:

The presence of FBs is also «small» ( S ) in the «Biscuits and Industrial Pastries» subsector. The number of FBs is smaller in the «Biscuits» business, where large investments in production processes and advertising are needed, and larger in «Pastries», where the firms tend to be local, do not need to make major investments in plant or distribution, and are close in size to the average for the sector.

Finally, the presence of FB is more or less «equal» (E) to that of NFBs in the following subsectors:

- «Wines and Liquors», which is one of the most important subsectors of the Food and Beverage industry in terms of number of firms, sales volume and size of workforce. There are noticeable differences between «Wines» and «Liquors» in that the «Liquors» business demands large advertising investments and has become concentrated at a global level in a very small number of companies, whereas the «Wines» business, rather than advertising investment, requires years of tradition and gradual brand building, as the technology is relatively simple. The mean sales of the firms in this subsector are close to the average for the sample as a whole, yet their average level of equity is twice that of the sample and their average age is over 63 years. In other words, these firms have entered the third generation and have had time (Haman and Freeman, 1989) to grow to considerable size in terms of sales and equity.
- «Frozen Foods and Ice-Cream», which has a relatively large number of firms, high total sales and a large workforce within the Food and Beverage industry. The firms in this subsector are comparable in size (sales and equity) to the mean of the sample, but their average age is the lowest of all the subsectors. The «Ice-Cream» segment is very concentrated, with five firms (three of which belong to multinationals) representing $80 \%$ of the market. These firms require large investments in logistics and cold storage, as well as in brand building. The «Frozen Foods» segment is less concentrated. It has seen a trend towards more highly processed and ready-cooked products and an internationalization of the markets.
- «Soft Drinks», a relatively young subsector with a large average size of firm due to the importance of Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola, which to a certain extent rely on concessionaires that are FBs, and Schweppes, which has a different concession policy. The influence of private label and the need for investment in plant and advertising may lead to greater concentration in this subsector.
- «Pasta», which is not a big volume subsector. Most of the firms are local and there are few nationally recognized brands. There is a trend towards greater concentration by means of acquisitions and the restructuring of plants and distribution warehouses as a result of changes of policy on the part of the distributors.
- «Dried Fruit and Snacks», which, particularly in the Dried Fruit segment, requires intense personal contact with the primary producing sector, a fact that would seem to favor FBs. However, the tendency towards «packaging», «brand name» and exports encourages greater concentration.
- «Spices, Sauces and Vinegar», which is not a large subsector in total sales or size of workforce. It is made up of relatively small firms (in terms of sales and equity).
Table 29. Presence and share of FBs in each subsector


[^3]
## Comparison by Autonomous Communities

Table 30 displays information regarding the presence of FBs in the 17 Autonomous Communities.

In view of this information, we can say that the FBs in Catalonia, Andalusia and Madrid represent the largest part of the FBs in the Food and Beverage industry (close to $50 \%$ in number and $60 \%$ in sales). They are particularly prominent in Catalonia, where their age is close to the average for the sample, and in Andalusia, where they are, on average, older.

Galicia, Murcia and Valencia are also important (nearly $30 \%$ of the total number of FBs and around $25 \%$ of total FB sales). The average age of the firms suggests that they are at the stage of the changeover from the first to the second generation. They rely on the competitive advantages they have in their local market.

At the opposite extreme, FBs have a very small presence in Navarre, despite the existence of tax legislation that favors inheritances and a relatively large agricultural sector.

Finally, it is worth pointing out the presence of FBs in Castile La Mancha and Extremadura, since these are, on average, young firms whose founders are probably still fully active.
Table 30. Presence and share of FBs in each autonomous community
Number of firms, sales, workforce,
exports (of FBs)
\% of the total of each variable in $\%$ of the total of each variable in
each community

- In the dimension «Num. of firms» Symbol Meaning $\%>60 \%$ $\%<40 \%$
- For the other dimensions
Symbol Meaning $+\quad$ it is $20 \%$ higher than the \% of «Num. of firms» it is $20 \%$ lower than the $\%$ of «Num. of firms»


## 4. Concluding remarks

As we said in our Introduction, the purpose of this study is to expand our knowledge of the role of FBs in the Spanish economy and help us understand any differences of behavior there may be between FBs and NFBs.

As far as previous studies by other authors regarding the impact of FBs on the economy is concerned, it has to be stressed how important it is that the analysis be done by breaking the sample down into different levels of sales, workforce, etc. and different subsectors. Studies carried out on a broad range of firms merely yield «averages», in which, as we have seen, a small number of «exceptional» companies can have a disproportionate influence, distorting the comparison between FBs and NFBs and the final conclusions.

This study has revealed, with more clarity than previous research, that FBs have difficulty in reaching the same size as NFBs over the same period of time. In other words, FBs have difficulty growing. In view of this, research into FBs should place greater emphasis on identifying the reasons for these difficulties and finding ways of overcoming them. Our study of the Food and Beverage industry allows us to identify the following reasons:

- There are FBs that do not grow because they do not have the sort of corporate culture that makes growth the «driving force» of strategy and «sacrifices» other things such as security, ownership, etc. to the objective of becoming a large company.
- Some FBs do not grow because they do not have the capacity to develop their organization, that is to say, to change their responsibility structure, management systems and governing bodies. This incapacity is due in part to the fact that family members remain in their jobs for too long (even for life) and in part to the tendency to wait for a new generation to join the firm before making changes, without realising that the period of time between two generations may be too long to wait.
- There are FBs that do not grow because they do not have the necessary financial resources. In some cases this lack may be due to their not having had time to «accumulate» resources fast enough. In other cases it may be due to a wish to spread the risk, not always successfully, by investing in other business activities that are mistakenly regarded as straightforward and turn out to require far more money than expected. The lack of resources may also be due to an unwillingness to accept new partners who would take a share of the ownership out of the hands of the family, or to an exclusive reliance on particular banks, which end up recommending «conservative» strategies in order to protect their investments (Leach, 1990).

We need to increase our knowledge of how and why FBs survive, and of the reasons why a very small number of them achieve very high growth and can even appear «invincible», while the majority not only grow slowly, but also remain relatively small. Our analysis of the different subsectors of the Food and Beverage industry shows that:

- FBs are more active in «young» subsectors, or in subsectors whose evolution has been relatively slower, giving them time to reach a competitive size.
- FBs are also more active in subsectors where the «local» content (ranging from contacts with suppliers and customers to the format and flavors of the products) is more important.
- FBs are more active in market niches where general brand prestige is not as important as custom service.
- FBs are more active in subsectors that have high entry barriers and slow growth rates, where firms with relatively low sales, equity, investment, etc. are still «viable».
- FBs are more active in subsectors that are less sensitive to cyclical swings in the economy.
- FBs are less active in globalized, highly concentrated subsectors where large investments are needed to obtain scale economies and achieve brand recognition.
- Finally, the analysis of the firms in the upper ranges of the various dimensions and ratios provides further evidence that FBs are more active in sectors where production and behavior are more traditional than in the service sectors, where a more innovative organizational approach is often required (Gallo and Estapé, 1992; Leach, 1990), which suggests that FBs resist strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions.

[^4](2) Alimarket does not provide data in all these dimensions for every firm. The number of firms for which information is available for each dimension as well as its status as a FB or NFB is as follows:

- Sales: 867 firms ( $440 \mathrm{FB}, 419 \mathrm{NFB}, 8$ could not be classified)
- Workforce: 845 firms ( 428 FB, 410 NFB)
- Exports: 449 firms ( 242 FB, 204 NFB)
- Imports: 69 firms ( $41 \mathrm{FB}, 28 \mathrm{NFB}$ )
- lnvestment: 536 firms ( $256 \mathrm{FB}, 276 \mathrm{NFB}$ )
- Equity: 487 firms ( 248 FB, 237 NFB)
- Profit 176 firms ( 66 FB, 108 NFB)
(3) The industry consisted of 40,327 firms in 1990. 22,614 of these belonged to the «Bread Stores, Biscuits and Confectionery» subsector.
(4) All data relating to workforce refer to permanent workforce.
(5) Exhibit 1 presents a comparison between FBs and NFBs using data from the USA, showing a much stronger presence of FBs among firms with sales of over 500 million dollars (approximately equivalent to 50 billion pesetas).
(6) Merino and Salas (1993), using information from ESEE (Business Strategy Survey «Panorama de la industria española», Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, 1993), with data from 1990, point out that $55.8 \%$ of the firms with fewer than 100 employees are FBs; the proportion drops to $22.6 \%$ in the 100 500 employee range and to $10.1 \%$ of firms with over 500 employees.

If the firms that contribute data to ESEE are representative of the Spanish economy, we can say that the Food and Beverage industry has a significantly greater number of FBs among larger firms.
(7) It should be pointed out that the information in this section is for only 532 firms instead of the 859 that were used for «Sales» or the 838 used for «Workforce». The fact that many firms in the Food and Beverage sector are local players with no international activities leads one to suspect that the reason why Alimarket has no information on the exports of some 300 firms from the sample is simply that these firms do not export, although we cannot be sure of this.

## Exhibit 1

FAMILY BUSINESSES IN THE USA

Taking as a universe the 9.5 million firms in the Dun \& Bradstreet database, and considering the ones that in 1991 had sales of over 25 million dollars per year ( 1 dollar $=104$ pesetas), the comparison between FBs and NFBs is as follows:

| Level of sales (millions <br> of dollars) | $25-50$ |  | $50-100$ |  | $100-250$ | $250-500$ | $>500$ |  | Total |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type of firm | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NBF | FB | NFB | FB | NFB | FB | NFB |
| Number of firms | 23,784 | 3,008 | 11,422 | 2,451 | 6,478 | 2,506 | 2,047 | 1,235 | 1,796 | 2,037 | 45,527 | 11,237 |
| $\%-----$ | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| $\%$ | $89 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $82 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $72 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $62 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $53 \%$ | $80 \%$ | $20 \%$ |

Dirk Dreux, «The Family Business Advisor», January 1993.

Exhibit 2
FIRMS WITH SALES OF OVER 50,000 MILLION PESETAS

| Firm | Type | Subsector | Sales <br> (million ptas.) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| CIA. SERV. BEBIDAS REFRESCANTES,S.A. | NFB | SOFT DRINKS | 145,000 |
| * PEDRO DOMECQ, S.A. (GRUPO) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 111,959 |
| CARGILL, ESPANA, S.A. | FB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 82,586 |
| * ELOSUA, S.A. (GRUPO) | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 77,837 |
| * EBRO, CIA. AZUC., S.A. (GRUPO) | NFB | SUGAR AND HONEY | 75,918 |
| * DANONE, S.A. | NFB | DAIRY PRODUCTS | 66,500 |
| *SCHWEPPES, S.A. | NFB | SOFT DRINKS | 51,500 |

FIRMS WITH A WORKFORCE OF OVER 1,000 PEOPLE

| Firm | Type | Subsector | Workforce <br> (num. of people) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| * DANONE, S.A | NFB | DAIRY PRODUCTS | 4,098 |
| * PEDRO DOMECQ, S.A. (GRUPO) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 3,931 |
| CRUZCAMPO (GRUPO) | NFB | BEER | 3,017 |
| S.A. EL AGUILA | NFB | BEER | 2,703 |
| BIMBO, S.A. | NFB | BISCUITS AND IND. PASTRIES | 2,671 |
| PRODUCTOS PEPSICO, S.A. | NFB | DRIED FRUITS | 2,145 |
| * EBRO, CIA. AZUC., S.A. (GRUPO) | NFB | SUGAR AND HONEY | 2,072 |
| * SCHWEPPES, S.A. | NFB | SOFT DRINKS | 1,946 |
| KNORR ELORZA, S.A. (KESA) | NFB | SOFT DRINKS | 1,656 |
| LECHE PASCUAL, S.A. | FB | DAIRY PRODUCTS | 1,616 |
| PESCANOVA, S.A. | FB | FROZEN FOODS | 1,607 |
| CONSERVERA CAMPOFRIO, S.A. | FB | MEAT PRODUCTS | 1,547 |
| MAHOU, S.A. | NFB | BEER | 1,500 |
| UNIASA | NFB | DAIRY PRODUCTS | 1,316 |
| UNION CERVECERA, S.A. | NFB | BEER | 1,298 |
| S.A. DAMM | NFB | BEER | 1,275 |
| SAN MIGUEL, S.A. | NFB | BEER | 1,248 |
| OMSA ALIMENTACION, S.A. | NFB | MEAT PRODUCTS | 1,235 |
| LA CRUZ DEL CAMPO, S.A. | NFB | BEER | 1,230 |
| OSBORNE Y CIA., S.A. (GRUPO) | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 1,204 |
| * ELOSUA, S.A. (GRUPO) | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 1,188 |
| HIJOS DE ANDRES MOLINA, S.A. | FB | MEAT PRODUCTS | 1,179 |
| CASBEGA, S.A. | FB | SOFT DRINKS | 1,074 |
| AVIDESA LUIS SUNTER, S.A. | FB | FROZEN FOODS | 1,069 |
| BODEGAS Y BEBIDAS, S.A. (GRUPO) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 1,047 |
| COBEGA, S.A. | FB | SOFT DRINKS | 1,000 |

[^5]Exhibit 3
FIRMS WITH A SALES/WORKFORCE RATIO OF OVER 500 MILLION PESETAS

Exhibit 4
FIRMS WITH EXPORTS OF OVER 5,000 MILLIONS PESETAS

| Firm | Type | Sector | $\begin{gathered} \text { Exports } \\ \text { (million ptas.) } \end{gathered}$ | Sales (million ptas.) | Workforce (num. of people) | Casual workforce (num. of people) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ESPAÑOLA DE ALIMENTACION (3) | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 12,278 | 12,278 | 5 | N.A. |
| CARGILL, ESPAÑA, S.A. | FB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 8,130 | 82,586 | 971 | 123 |
| ELOSUA, S.A. (GRUPO) (1) (2) | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 8,000 | 77,837 | 1,188 | 1,395 |
| FREIXENET, S.A. (GRUPO) | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 7,937 | 28,400 | 698 | N.A. |
| JOHN HARVEY, S.A. | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 7,872 | 8,381 | 217 | 63 |
| FRIO CONDAL, S.A. | FB | FROZEN FOOD | 7,500 | 25,000 | 800 | N.A. |
| PEDRO DOMECQ, S.A. (GRUPO) (1) (2) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 7,000 | 111,959 | 3,931 | N.A. |
| BODEGAS Y BEBIDAS, S.A. (GRUPO) (2) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 6,241 | 20,824 | 1,047 | N.A. |
| AGRO SEVILLA, S. COOP. (3) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 5,631 | 5,891 | 9 | N.A. |
| CIA. ENVASADORA LORETO, S.A. | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 5,476 | 5,993 | 134 | 665 |
| MINERVA, S.A. | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 5,434 | 8,037 | 40 | 36 |

N.A.: Not available.
(1) Sales of more than 50,000 million pesetas (Exhibit 2).
(2) Workforce of more than 1,000 people (Exhibit 2).
(3) Sales/workforce ratio of over 500 million pesetas (Exhibit 3).
Exhibit 5
FIRMS WITH EXPORTS OF MORE THAN 75\% OF SALES

| Firm | Type | Subsector | Exports/ sales | Sales <br> (million ptas.) | Workforce (num. of people) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GRUPO HARVEY, S.A. | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 100\% | 1,788 | N.A. | N.A. |
| EUROLIVA, S.A. | FB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 100\% | 2,000 | 48 | 175 |
| JOHN HARVEY AND SONS (ESPANA), S.A. | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 100\% | 2,081 | 118 | N.A. |
| TE-PE, S.A. | FB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 100\% | 2,200 | 39 | 150 |
| GOYA EN ESPAÑA, S.A. | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 100\% | 1,000 | 35 | 15 |
| OILEX, S.A. | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 100\% | 1,200 | 16 | N.A. |
| LUIS PAEZ, S.A. | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 100\% | 1,325 | 20 | N.A. |
| HISPANOLIVA, S.A. | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 100\% | 1,504 | 10 | N.A. |
| ESPAÑOLA DE ALIMENTACION (3) (4) | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 100\% | 12,278 | 5 | N.A. |
| JOSE MEDINA Y CIA., S.A. | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 98\% | 2,700 | 64 | 25 |
| SANCHEZ POLAINA, S.A. | FB | FLOUR | 98\% | 3,209 | 40 | 15 |
| AGRO SEVILLA, S. COOP. (4) | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 96\% | 5,891 | 9 | N.A. |
| ACEITUNAS DE MESA CORDOBA, S.C.L. | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 94\% | 1,474 | 16 | 31 |
| JOHN HARVEY, S.A. (4) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 94\% | 8,381 | 217 | 63 |
| CONSERVAS SANFRUTAS, S.A. | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 92\% | 1,300 | 20 | 102 |
| PRODUCTOS MENCEY, S.A. | FB | SPICES AND VINEGARS | 92\% | 1,800 | 16 | 4 |
| CIA. ENVASADORA LORETO, S.A. (4) | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 91\% | 5,993 | 134 | 665 |
| CONSERVAS Y FRUTAS, S.A. (COFRUSA) | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 91\% | 4,800 | 100 | 400 |
| AGRO SEVILLA ACEITUNAS, S. COOP. (3) | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 90\% | 2,064 | 28 | 100 |
| CIA. COLOME DE ACEITES, S.A. | FB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 90\% | 1,300 | 10 | 5 |
| C. AUGUSTO EGLI, S.A. | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 90\% | 1,050 | 38 | 3 |
| BODEGAS SCHENK, S.A. | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 90\% | 2,000 | 40 | 3 |
| IND. PIMENTONERA MURCIANA, S.A. | FB | SPICES AND VINEGARS | 88\% | 1,467 | 51 | 36 |
| ZETA ESPECIAL, S.A. | NFB | SWEETS | 88\% | 1,150 | 51 | 17 |
| CROFT JEREZ, S.A. | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 88\% | 4,000 | 90 | N.A. |
| AROTZ, S.A. | NFB | FROZEN FOODS | 86\% | 3,159 | 38 | 193 |
| GREXAVAL, S.A. | FB | DRIED FRUITS | 82\% | 1,693 | 18 | 50 |
| UNICHAMP, S.A.T. | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 82\% | 1,100 | 12 | 130 |
| FRIO INDUSTRIAL CEÑO, S.A. (FRICENSA) | FB | FROZEN FOODS | 80\% | 2,100 | 28 | 22 |
| VICENTE GANDIA PLA, S.A. | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 80\% | 2,848 | 38 | 12 |
| INDUSTRIAS VIDECA, S.A. | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 79\% | 1,107 | 26 | 480 |
| AGRAZ, S.A. | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 77\% | 2,600 | 95 | N.A. |
| BODEGAS INTERNACIONALES,S.A. | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 76\% | 2,900 | 135 | N.A. |

(3) Sales/workforce ratio of over 500 million pesetas (Exhibit 3).
(4) Exports of more than 5,000 million pesetas (Exhibit 4).
Exhibit 6
FIRMS WITH EQUITY OF OVER 10,000 MILLION PESETAS

| Firm | Type | Subsector | $\begin{gathered} \text { Equity } \\ \text { (million ptas.) } \end{gathered}$ | Sales (million ptas.) | Workforce (num. of people) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Casual } \\ \text { workforce } \\ \text { (num. of people) } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EBRO, CIA. AZUC., S.A. (GRUPO) (1) (2) | NFB | SUGAR AND HONEY | 34,651 | 75,918 | 2,072 | N.A. |
| PEDRO DOMECQ, S.A. (GRUPO) (1) (2) (4) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 30,609 | 111,959 | 3,931 | N.A. |
| LA CRUZ DEL CAMPO, S.A. (2) | NFB | BEER | 29,729 | 33,821 | 1,230 | 168 |
| S.A. EL AGUILA (2) | NFB | BEER | 22,825 | 43,762 | 2,703 | N.A. |
| CIA. DE INDUSTRIAS AGRICOLAS, S.A. | NFB | HONEY AND SUGAR | 18,269 | 33,073 | 979 | 840 |
| SDAD. GRAL. AZUCARERA DE ESPAÑA, S.A. | NFB | HONEY AND SUGAR | 16,121 | 32,671 | 578 | 469 |
| S.A. DAMM (2) | NFB | BEER | 15,030 | 25,695 | 1,275 | N.A. |
| LARIOS, S.A. (GRUPO) | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 14,693 | 30,102 | 152 | 98 |
| OSBORNE Y CIA., S.A. (GRUPO) (2) | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 13,562 | 41,511 | 1,204 | N.A. |
| CODORNIU, S.A. (GRUPO) | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 13,490 | 23,723 | 765 | N.A. |
| KOIPE, S.A. (GRUPO) | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 13,151 | 44,431 | 605 | 61 |
| CONSERVERA CAMPOFRIO, S.A. (2) | FB | MEAT PRODUCTS | 12,980 | 40,529 | 1,547 | 326 |
| SAN MIGUEL, S.A. (2) | NFB | BEER | 12,526 | 30,697 | 1,284 | N.A. |
| CARGILL, ESPAÑA, S.A. (1) (4) | FB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 12,242 | 82,586 | 971 | 123 |
| BIMBO, S.A. (2) | NFB | BISCUITS AND IND. PASTRIES | 12,197 | 25,083 | 2,671 | N.A. |
| KOIPE, S.A. | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 11,421 | 41,382 | 459 | N.A. |
| FERNANDO A. DE TERRY, S.A. | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 10,725 | 9,971 | 358 | 55 |
| LECHE PASCUAL, S.A. (2) | FB | DAIRY PRODUCTS | 10,495 | 46,071 | 1,616 | N.A. |

(1) Sales of more than 50,000 million pesetas (Exhibit 2).
(4) Exports of more than 5,000 million people (Exhibit 4).
Exhibit 7
FIRMS WITH AND EQUITY/WORKFORCE RATIO OF OVER 50 MILLION PESETAS

| Firm | Type | Subsector | $\begin{gathered} \text { Equity/ } \\ \text { workforce } \\ \text { (million ptas.) } \end{gathered}$ | Sales <br> (million ptas.) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Workforce } \\ \text { (num. of people) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Casual } \\ \text { workforce } \\ \text { (num. of people) } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AGRICULTURA Y CONSERVAS, S.A. | NFB | CANNED VEGETABLES | 179 | 1,000 | 7 | 350 |
| DIEZ MERITO, S.A. | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 163 | 1,200 | 36 | N.A. |
| COOPERATIVA VETA LA MORA (3) | NFB | PASTA | 129 | 1,400 | 1 | 3 |
| LARIOS, S.A. (GRUPO) (6) | FB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 97 | 30,102 | 152 | 98 |
| CROFT JEREZ, S.A. (5) | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 69 | 4,000 | 90 | N.A. |
| AROTZ, S.A. (5) | NFB | FROZEN FOODS | 60 | 3,159 | 38 | 193 |
| INTERMALTA, S.A. | NFB | BEER | 58 | 6,100 | 32 | N.A. |
| COOPERATIVA VIRGEN DE LAS VIÑAS | NFB | WINES AND LIQUORS | 58 | 1,817 | 14 | 40 |
| SAIMAZA, S.A. | NFB | COFFEE AND TEA | 57 | 5,550 | 145 | N.A. |
| ACEITES RUMOLIVA, S.A. | NFB | VEGETABLE OIL AND FAT | 55 | 1,800 | 16 | 12 |
| UNION DISTRIBUIDORA PASTELERIA, S.A. (3) | NFB | BISCUITS AND IND. PASTRIES | 51 | 2,497 | 2 | 4 |

N.A.: Not available.
(3) Sales/workforce ratio of over 500 million pesetas (Exhibit 3). (4) Exports/sales ratio of over 75\% (Exhibit 5).
(6) Equity of more than 10,000 million pesetas (Exhibit 6).
Exhibit 8
FIRMS WITH A YEARLY FIXED ASSET INVESTMENT OF OVER 5,000 MILLION PESETAS
Exhibit 9
FIRMS WITH AN INVESTMENT/WORKFORCE RATIO OF OVER 25 MILLION PESETAS

| Firm | Type | Subsector | Investment/ <br> Workforce <br> (million pesetas) | Sales <br> (million <br> pesetas) | Workforce <br> (num. of people) | Casual <br> workforce <br> (num. of people) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| KAS, S.A. (GRUPO) (3) | FB | SOFT DRINKS | 122 | 13,600 | 16 |  |
| COOPERATIVA VETA LA MORA (3) (7) | NFB | PASTA | 100 | 2 |  |  |
| UNION DISTRIBUIDORA PASTELERIA, S.A. (3) (7) | NFB | BISCUITS AND IND. PASTRIES | 60 | 1,400 | 2 |  |
| RAMON PUIG, S.A. | NFB | MEAT PRODUCTS | 26 | 2,497 | 1,092 | 2 |

(3) Sales/workforce ratio of over 500 million pesetas (Exhibit 3).
(7) Equity/workforce ratio of over 50 million pesetas (Exhibit 7).

| Firm | Type | Subsector | $\begin{array}{c}\text { Year of } \\ \text { foundation }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c}\text { Sales } \\ \text { (million ptas.) }\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c}\text { Workforce } \\ \text { (num. of people) }\end{array}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (num. of people) |  |  |  |  |  |$)$

(2) Workforce of more than 1,000 people (Exhibit 2).
(5) Equity of more than 10,000 million pesetas (Exhibit 6).

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[^0]:    (*) This document has been produced with the financial assistance of Arthur Andersen and with the help of Pablo Gallo in processing the data.

[^1]:    * Yearly fixed asset investment.

[^2]:    * Yearly fixed asset investment.

[^3]:    * Yearly fixed asset investment

[^4]:    (1) The Food and Beverage industry comprises the following subsectors:

    Food

    - Oils and Fats
    - Sugar and Honey
    - Coffee and Tea
    - Meat Products
    - Frozen Foods
    - Canned Fish
    - Canned Vegetables
    - Sweets
    - Spices, Sauces and Vinegar
    - Dried Fruit and Snacks
    - Biscuits, Industrial Pastries and Breakfast Cereals
    - Flour
    - Dairy products
    - Pasta, Rice and Legumes

    Beverages

    - Bottled Water
    - Beer
    - Soft Drinks
    - Wines and Liquors
    - Juices, Ciders and Grape Juice.

[^5]:    * Firms belonging to both groups.

